WHAT DIDN’T HAPPEN:
AN ESSAY IN SPECULATION
PETER JASZI

Most of us held off celebrating the beginning of a renewed slow
trickle of works into copyright’s public domain until the first seconds of
New Year’s Day, 2019, but (if it hadn’t been so early in the day), we
would have been entitled to raise a glass at 4:04 PM on the preceding
December 27th, when the last substantive business undertaken in 2018 by
either house of Congress was concluded in the Senate. (Like the House,
which wrapped up its business at 4:02, the World’s Greatest Deliberative
Body had convened that day at 4:00.) At that moment, a last-minute
push to extend copyrights beyond the 20-year bonus terms awarded in
the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension became a practical and
mathematical impossibility. This was all the more true since no
legislation to achieve that result had been introduced in either house
during the 115th Congress.
Obviously, non-events matter, not only in the Holmesian
heuristic sense (per the “curious incident” recited in The Adventure of
Silver Blaze), but substantively as well. Some of the last 25 years’ most
important positive developments in copyright policy have—in fact—
been negatives: the collapse of the SOPA/PIPA bills in 2012, the
congressional failure to enact categorical and comprehensive
paracopyright legislation in 1998,1 and the long and ultimately successful
effort (throughout the mid-and late-90’s) to block enactment of sui
generis database protection in U.S. law.2 The congress’s failure to enact
term extension legislation (despite having been greenlighted by the
Supreme Court in Eldred v. Reno) is another example.
So one minor goal of this essay is to celebrate the power of
inaction. Another is to acknowledge the pleasure of having your
1

As originally called for by a Clinton administration Commerce Department
Task Force on Information Infrastructure. BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF
THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter
WHITE PAPER]. In the event, the final version of the new Chapter 12 of U.S.
Code Title 17, introduced in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,
constrained as it was by a workable mechanism for defining exceptions to the
prohibitions against “circumvention,” has proven inconvenient, expensive, and
downright frustrating but not a measurable drag on innovation.
2
For references to this still largely untold story, see INDRANATH GUPTA,
FOOTPRINTS OF FEIST IN EUROPEAN DATABASE DIRECTIVE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
OF IP LAW-MAKING IN EUROPE (2017).
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predictions proven wrong. I’m happy to say that in 1995 I told a Senate
panel that a 20-year term extension would “represent[] a down payment
on perpetual copyright on the installment plan.”3 Obviously, and
happily, it didn’t work out that way. My main objective in what follows
is to suggest what accounts for that particular negative result. In other
words, how did the time-honored notion of periodic add-ons to copyright
duration, so recently viewed as non-controversial, become politically
toxic over less than two decades? 4
In search of an explanation, you are invited to return with us now
to those thrilling days of yesteryear to witness what is arguably the
primal scene in which influence and ideology conceived the
contemporary term extension movement. In May 1962, the stage was set
in a House of Representatives Judiciary Committee hearing room.
Congress recently had begun the process of devising comprehensive
copyright reform legislation, and it was already clear that (among other
things) it eventually would change the law in various ways. The most
foreseeable and (then) least controversial of these would be to introduce
a modest prospective extension of copyright term. It was just as easy to
predict that any change in the formula would put the next generation of
copyright owners at a durational advantage vis-à-vis the current one—so
that transitional provisions to harmonize existing and new copyright
terms would be politically necessary in the final legislative package. But
because all of this was going to take some time (14 years, as it turned
out!) there was a more immediate problem: If copyright terms calculated
the old-fashioned way continued to run their course, some rightsholders
would lose their existing protection before the new dispensation kicked
in. A rough and ready solution would be to extend existing renewal
terms while the new legislation was being considered, and this bill before
the House was the first such “interim extension” to be proposed.5 The
3

The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 72 (1995) (statement of Peter Jaszi, Professor of
Law, American University). My near contemporary reflections on this richly
demoralizing experience can be found in Peter Jaszi, Goodbye to All That—A
Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded
Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 595
(1996).
4
See Timothy B. Lee, Why Mickey Mouse’s Copyright Term Extension
Probably Won’t Happen Again, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 8, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/01/hollywood-says-its-not-planninganother-copyright-extension-push.
5
See Extending the Duration of Copyright Protection in Certain Cases: Hearing
on H.J. Res. 627 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, 87th Cong. (1962) [hereinafter Hearing on Extending
the Duration of Copyright Protection]. The 1961 Report of the Register of
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Judiciary Committee had consulted with the Justice Department, which
had expressed strong reservations, writing that it would be “unwise” to
extend the term of copyright from the viewpoint of the public “which
is interested in the early passing of copyrighted material into the
public domain.”6
Then as now, it was unusual but not unheard of for a member of
Congress to appear as a witness before a committee other than their own;
it was even more unusual when that member was one of the most
powerful members of the body. Nevertheless, the next voice you hear is
that of Majority Whip Hale Boggs (D-LA) countering the
administration’s stated position with remarks leading up to this oldfashioned stemwinder of a conclusion:
This startling statement is wholly inconsistent with reality. The
public does not gain from the “early passing of copyrighted
material into the public domain.” When a copyright passes into the
public domain, the public is not the beneficiary. The right to make
the profit passes from the creator or the original publisher to a
person who has contributed nothing to the work. The cost of a
ticket to a Bach, Beethoven, or Brahms concert is no less than to
one which provides the music of contemporary composers.
Listening to radio or watching television programs which use public
domain material costs no less than programs utilizing copyrighted
works. Copyrighted and public domain works are sold in books in
same price ranges.
The public cannot have any real interest in depriving authors,
composers, or artists of their incomes from the books or songs or
plays which they have written, or from the picture which they
create. What benefit can result to a society dedicated to free
enterprise from depriving some of its citizens of the earnings of
their productions during their lifetime. Are we to say to our young
authors, playwrights, composers, and others that they may live by
their talents provided they do not live too long? Are we to say to
Copyrights that kicked off the reform process made a relatively modest
suggestion: retain the long-prevailing general approach based on a relatively
short initial term of 28 years commencing at publication, but extend the
additional “renewal” term potentially upon application from 28 to 48 years. See
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT Law 50–51 (Comm. Print 1961),
https://www.copyright.gov/history/1961_registers_report.pdf (proposing a
maximum general term of “76 years from first dissemination” [20 years longer
than the law then provided]).
6
Hearing on Extending the Duration of Copyright Protection, supra note 5, at
30 (statement of Rep. Cramer, referring to a letter from the Attorney General).
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them that no matter how great their skills, despite their talents, and
irrespective of the dedication to their work, if they commence
writing too young and live too long, there is no place for them in
our free enterprise society? Are we to tell them that the only
property of value which can be transmitted to their dependents must
be in the form of stocks, bonds, cash, or real property and that
intellectual property must be valueless to them?
There is no benefit to the public from the “early passage of
works into the public domain.” That is a foreign philosophy—on
which is the very anthesis of the standards by which we live. In our
society the creator of intellectual property cannot be the forgotten
man, or we shall become a forgotten society.7

Why Rep. Boggs chose to insert himself into this debate on the
side of interim copyright extension remains (at least to me) unclear. But
for present purposes the politics of his intervention is less interesting
than its rhetoric. Most notably (in addition to summoning the spirit of
capitalism and darkly denouncing foreign influence), he models an
approach to assessing (and denigrating) the value of the public domain
which would dominate discussion for decades to come. In effect, Boggs
suggests, allowing works to exit copyright would confer a public benefit
only if it had a measurable effect on conventional measures of consumer
welfare such as the unit price of a book or a concert ticket—and
advocates of the term limitation have failed to meet their burden on that
point. In the absence of such a showing—Boggs asserts—there is no
reason to resist creators’ “natural” property claims.8
7

Hearing on Extending the Duration of Copyright Protection, supra note 5, at 6
(statement of Rep. Hale Boggs).
8
The proposed interim extension was enacted, and was the first of nine similar
bills passed over years to preserve copyrights already in their renewal terms,
ultimately qualifying them for the 20-year extension provided in the Copyright
Act of 1976. Where prospective protection was concerned, however, the 1976
Act departed dramatically from the approach proposed back in 1961; following
general international practice, it abolished the two-term scheme in favor of a
basic unitary term consisting of the life of the author plus fifty years. In
retrospect, we can see that the elimination of the renewal formality represented
the single most dramatic extension of copyright term in U.S. history, since under
the old dispensation the vast majority of copyrights wound up at the end of the
initial term. See generally Jamie Carlstone et al., Copyright Renewal of U.S.
Books Published in 1932: Re-analyzing Ringer's Study to Determine a More
Accurate Renewal Rate for Books, 79 COLLEGE & RES. LIBRARIES 697 (2018),
available at https://doi.org/10.5860/crl.79.5.697. But that’s another story.
So is the one that follows, but I can’t resist. The specific claim that Boggs
understands as deriving from the frictionless operation of authors’ rights is, at
least, relatively modest in scope, i.e., “creators should be able to live by their
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talents,” as well as to pass along something (unspecified in extent) to their
“descendants.” More than a half century earlier, that hot-and-cold champion of
creative entitlement, Samuel Langhorne Clemens, had been more explicit in his
testimony on what would become the Copyright Act of 1909: “I like that
extension of copyright life to the author’s life and fifty years afterward. I think
that would satisfy any reasonable author, because it would take care of his
children. Let the grand-children take care of themselves. That would take care
of my daughters, and after that I am not particular. I shall then have long been
out of this struggle, independent of it, indifferent to it.” To Amend and
Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Arguments Before the Committees
on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives, Conjointly, on the Bills
S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, 59th Cong. 196–201 (1906) (statement of Mr. Samuel
L. Clemens); Mark Twain in White Amuses Congressmen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1906, at 5,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1906/12/08/101852379.pdf.
Did he mean the last, or was the joke just too good to let pass? Either way, we
can recognize in Twain’s main discourse a version of the argument from
generational succession that would gain traction in years to follows. Consider,
for example, the actuarially dubious congressional rationale for the CTEA
memorialized by Justice Ginsberg in Eldred v. Ashcroft:
Members of Congress expressed the view that, as a result of increases
in human longevity and in parents’ average age when their children are
born, the pre-CTEA term did not adequately secure the right to profit
from licensing one’s work during one’s lifetime and to take pride and
comfort in knowing that one’s children—and perhaps their children—
might also benefit from one’s posthumous popularity. 141 Cong. Rec.
6553 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see 144 Cong. Rec. S12377
(daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Among the main
developments [compelling reconsideration of the 1976 Act's term] is
the effect of demographic trends . . . on the effectiveness of the lifeplus-50 term to provide adequate protection for American creators and
their heirs.”).
537 U.S. 186, 207, n.14 (2003).
Indeed, in her 1995 congressional testimony, Register of Copyrights Mary
Beth Peters had recited that “[p]rotection of two succeeding generations is the
standard goal recognized in [the] Berne [Convention]” citing various authorities
including recitals of the 1994 EU Directive on Copyright Term. Copyright
Term, Film Labeling, And Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 989,
H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
104th Cong. 175 n.39 (1995). Subsequently, defending the constitutionality of
the CTEA before the Supreme Court, the U.S. government asserted that in 1908,
the revision of the Berne Convention to provide for a basic term of “life-plus50” years was designed “to provide compensation during authors’ lives and
during the lives of any children or grandchildren”—and that, as a result, changes
in life expectancy justified the 20-year add-on. Brief for Respondent at 25,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
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Viewed from an author-centric perspective, all this makes perfect sense. A
copyright system that is author-directed, root and branch, could be expected to
elevate considerations relating to the welfare of creators’ survivors over, say,
public access. Certainly, this explanation of the rationale for term extension
provides relatively little room for weighing the consequences on pro and con.
But there is a problem with this plausible-sounding explanation, which no one
stopped to consider at the time: It is demonstrably untrue!
In fact, the records of the 1908 Diplomatic Conference (and that of 1967,
where term was discussed again for good measure) are innocent of any mention
of this author-centric rationale for term expansion. Sam Ricketson, the foremost
historian of Berne, has stated that “in the debates that took place at various
Berne revision conferences on the question of duration, one is hard pressed to
find reasoned justifications for the move for longer terms of protection.” Sam
Ricketson, The Copyright Term, 23 INT’L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT
L. 753, 778 (1992). Indeed, a 1991 Memo on the project for what was then
called the “Berne Protocol” (later rechristened the WIPO Treaty on Copyright)
states (shades of Mark Twain) that the original intent had been to “make
reasonably certain that at least the first generation of [heirs]” would benefit.
Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, 1st Sess.,
Nov. 4–8, 1991, WIPO Doc. BCP/CE/I/3, ¶ 159, (Oct. 8, 1991). So where does
this line of reasoning find its source? The answer may be found in Claude
Masouyé’s widely-read but authoritatively non-authoritative 1978 “Guide to the
Berne Convention,” a WIPO publication which recites that “It is not merely by
chance that fifty years was chosen. Most countries have felt it fair and right that
the average lifetime of an author and his direct descendants should be covered,
i.e. three generations.” CLAUDE MASOUYÉ, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) 46
(1978). Of course, as then-WIPO Secretary General Árpád Bogsch made clear
in his introduction, the Guide is not, in itself, “an authoritative interpretation.”
What was Masouyé’s authority? None is cited, but the closest I can come is his
own 1959 article, advocating for (without any identified source or precedent) the
position later enshrined in the official-seeming volume. Claude Masouye, Vers
une prolongation de la durée de la protection, 24 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU
DROIT D'AUTEUR 93 (July 1959) (Fr.), https://www.la-rida.com/fr/articlerida/3406. There, the evidentiary trail ends, as does this digression. Or almost.
I would be remiss to omit noting that Silke Von Lewinski’s Term of Protection
in Copyright repeats the rationale, although it adds no evidence for it. See Silke
von Lewinski, EC Proposal for a Council Directive Harmonizing the Term of
Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 23 INT’L REV. OF INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 753, 785 (1992).
So what, exactly, is demonstrated by this story of an all-too-plausible
explanation that has—in fact—no visible means of support? On the one hand,
perhaps, only that even the most distinguished scholars can, from time to time,
get carried away with themselves. On the other, I’d suggest, is a different
cautionary proposition: That the author-construct apparently enjoys, like the
Shadow, the power to cloud human minds. It is not for nothing that at p. 3 of his
statement, Rep. Boggs cites the century-old (and distinctly foreign) observation
that “equally with the builder or the planter, the author’s ownership of his work
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There’s nothing particularly remarkable in Boggs’ framing. For
decades, arguments on both sides of the issue were primarily made in
what might be called a “consumerist” frame, with crisscrossing claims
about whether a more robust public domain would (or wouldn’t) offer
more conventional information goods at lower prices. For many (or
most) of that era’s public domain advocates, myself included,9 engaged
with the issue primarily, if not exclusively, in similar terms. Even the
heroes of the early resistance to term extension, such as the late Professor
Dennis Karjala, cast their arguments about the costs of a longer
protection period primarily in terms of the loss to the public of specific
finished derivative works (such as motion pictures based on public
domain originals) that it might bring about—an expanded argument, to
be sure, but one with roots in the dominant consumerist rhetoric
nonetheless.10 It’s not a coincidence, therefore, that the “business
model” of the exemplary named plaintiff in the ultimate court challenge
to the constitutionality of the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term

is, in (literary raconteur and presumably proud parent) Disraeli’s famous words,
‘the most natural of all titles, because it is the most simple and least artificial. It
is paramount and sovereign, because it is a tenure by creation.’” 1 ISAAC
DISRAELI, THE CALAMITIES AND QUARRELS OF AUTHORS: WITH SOME INQUIRIES
RELATING TO THEIR MORAL AND LITERARY CHARACTER, AND SOME MEMOIRS
FOR OUR LITERARY HISTORY 30 (New York, W.J. Widdleton 1868), which the
publisher describes as “edited by his son, the Hon. Benjamin Disraeli” (‘silverfork’ novelist turned politician). Isaac Disraeli (b.1766) had died more than a
decade before the first British printing of this posthumous collection, which is
undated but may be as early as 1859.
9
In retrospect, my own 1995 comment that “discussions of the public domain
which center on whether high quality reprints of classics cost more or less than
cheaply produced mass market paperbacks trivialize the concept of the public
domain by overlooking its more central function as the source to which the
creative men and women of each generation turn for the materials they refashion
into new and newly valuable works of imagination” may have been on the track,
but read now it seems infuriatingly non-specific. Likewise, it is sobering to
reread David Lange’s beautiful 1981 article, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981), which launched a thousand inquiries, and
realize that it says almost nothing about the virtues of limited copyright as such
(rather than the vices of supplementary pseudo-copyright in state law). But see
id. at 150 n.16–19.
10
See Statement Of Copyright And Intellectual Property Law Professors In
Opposition To H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, & S. 505, “The Copyright Term Extension
Act,” from Dennis S. Karjala, Professor of Law, Arizona State University, to
Comms. on the Judiciary of S. & H.R. 12–13 (Jan. 28, 1998),
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/1
998Statement.html.
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Extension Act was giving away physical exemplars of downloaded
books (while encouraging others to follow suit).11
This narrow, market-oriented understanding of the value of the
public domain enabled, in turn, another set of tropes, in which the public
domain was figured as a kind of information limbo in which neglected
works linger precisely because nobody owns them. Here’s Bruce
Lehman, the Clinton administration’s “IP Czar,” in comfortable colloquy
with Senator Mike DeWine (R-Ohio) in the run up to the CTEA,
comprehensively missing the point about Shakespeare and the public
domain:
SEN. DEWINE: . . . Your contention . . . was that going into public
domain is really not necessarily to the benefit of the consumer . . .
How far do you take that? . . . .
MR. LEHMAN: . . . I can give you probably an example. I think
that sometimes you go to book stores, and you will see very old
films that have fallen into the public domain . . . [S]ome of those
films you will see in a book store have been reissued and sold very
cheaply as, you know, video cassettes maybe for $6 or $7 or
something like that. That would be an advantage. But you have to
balance that off by the fact that there are probably a lot more films
that have been lost to the public forever and never reissued at all
[nor] made available because nobody had the economic incentive to
do so.
SEN. DEWINE: To preserve them.
MR. LEHMAN: That is right, to preserve them and to put them out.
And I would also just say, if you think of your own behavior, if you
go into a book store, there are lots of books—you know,
Shakespeare is not under copyright anymore. Do you really see a
big difference in price between the public domain stuff and the
nonpublic domain stuff? Does that even enter into your
consciousness as a consumer?12

Representations of the public domain as a limbo of the unowned
still pop up from time to time, but—as the political collapse of copyright

11

For more on programmer/provocateur Eric Eldred and his Eldritch Press, see
generally Eric Eldred, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Eldred
(last visited on May 19, 2019).
12
The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 38 (1995) (testimony of Hon. Bruce Lehman,
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office);
but see MARIE HALL ETS, JUST ME 12 (1965) (“‘Rabbit,’ I said. [He didn’t have
any name because nobody owned him.]”).
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term extension demonstrates, they no longer dominate. So what
changed? My speculative sketch of a tentative answer follows.
Material objectification characterized not only millennial
discussions of the public domain; it also marked emerging discourse
about what came to be known as Internet policy—although we hadn’t yet
even settled on a name for the thing itself. It was “cyberspace” to those
like John Perry Barlow, who were committed to its disembodied
potentialities, and “the information superhighway” or (worse) the
“National Information Infrastructure” to its would-be regulators.
Although Barlow insisted in 1996 that “increasingly obsolete information
industries would perpetuate themselves by proposing laws, in America
and elsewhere, that claim to own speech itself throughout the world . . .
[that] would declare ideas to be another industrial product, no more noble
than pig iron.”13
(Or—he might have added—printed books.)
Nevertheless, in the political debates of 1994–98, toward which he
gestures here, the Internet was figured primarily as a complicated nearfrictionless system of virtual conduits for the distribution (or
misappropriation) of finished content.14 Indeed, this portrayal continued
to hold rhetorical sway when the Internet found itself under close judicial
scrutiny for the first time in connection with the file-sharing wars of the
13

John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 6 (2019).
14
Consider this, from the opening pages of the government report that started
the trouble:
The NII of tomorrow . . . will be much more than these separate
communications networks; it will integrate them into an advanced highspeed, interactive, broadband, digital communications system.
Computers, telephones, televisions, radios, fax machines and more will
be linked by the NII, and users will be able to communicate and
interact with other computers, telephones, televisions, radios, fax
machines and more—all in digital form. The NII has tremendous
potential to improve and enhance our lives. It can increase access to a
greater amount and variety of information and entertainment resources
that can be delivered quickly and economically from and to virtually
anywhere in the world in the blink of an eye. For instance, hundreds of
channels of “television” programming, thousands of musical
recordings, and literally millions of “magazines” and “books” can be
made available to homes and businesses across the United States and
around the world.
White Paper, supra note 1, at 8 (citations omitted). There are valuable nearcontemporary discussions of such figures of speech. See RAYMOND GOZZI JR.,
THE POWER OF METAPHOR IN THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA (1999); see also
Annette N. Markham, Metaphors Reflecting and Shaping the Reality of the
Internet: Tool, Place, Way of Being (2003) (unpublished paper)
(https://annettemarkham.com/writing/MarkhamTPW.pdf).
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early 2000’s. Both foes and friends of Napster and its sequelae
celebrated in, effect, the technology’s potency as a mode of distribution,
rather than confronting its potential to build disembodied communities of
interest(s).15
Soon thereafter, the grip of this rhetoric on the public
imagination began to loosen. Thanks to sweeping changes in the way we
think and talk about networked digital technology, no one ever again can
refer to the Internet as a “series of tubes” without major risk of
embarrassment.16 What once was viewed as a delivery system is now
commonly figured as a space for virtual interaction and collaboration––
in accord with Barlow’s foundational vision.17 And it is this shift that (in
turn) has enabled the emergence of what was for many a whole new way
to think about the public domain: less as a repository for disregarded
cultural cast-offs and more as a rich mine of source material.18 To those
of us with an early inchoate sense of the potential value inherent in the
unowned, it provided a new wealth of practical and appealing examples
of why the public domain really mattered. For others, direct experience
online was a powerful teacher in its own right. Either way, the trends

15

Copyright scholars did this discussion no favors by generally conceding the
issue of end-user infringement and focusing instead on the metes and bounds of
secondary liability. In retrospect, there was more space than we were then
aware to discuss the application of fair use to at least some peer-to-peer sharing
practices.
16
Not an “Internet of Things” but the Internet as Thing. See Cory Doctorow,
Sen. Stevens’ Hilariously Awful Explanation of the Internet, BOING BOING (July
2, 2006, 11:45 PM), https://boingboing.net/2006/07/02/sen-stevenshilariou.html.
17
And, giving credit where credit is due, that of Howard Rheingold.
Oxymoronically clashing title and sub-title notwithstanding, his book gave many
of us a first glimpse of the future. See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE
VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (1993).
18
Not that the old rhetoric ever vanished entirely from the scene. In 2014, a
New York Times article carried the following lead:
They show up in discount DVD bins, or more often today online,
sometimes looking a little worse for the wear. A general pall of
darkness might cloud the image; the dialogue might be a bit tinnier than
you remembered. Often the quality is not too shabby, though in the
case of the web, it can be a surprise that they’re online at all. They’re
films that have fallen out of copyright for one reason or another and
must weather the wilds of the public domain.
Nicolas Rapold, Even Good Films May Go to Purgatory, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/movies/old-filmsfall-into-public-domain-under-copyright-law.html.
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thus set in motion led directly to the Great Legislative Nonevent of
2018.19
This broad and consequential shift began, I would suggest, with
the availability of Web browsers and search engines, along with
increased opportunities to cut, paste, and modify digital files using a
growing host of applications and programs. Before the early 1990s,
taking creative advantage of the public domain entailed scouring
physical collections in search of old information objects, investing time
and money in transcribing them, and recasting them using skilled
techniques that hadn’t changed dramatically in decades (if not centuries).
But 1993 alone saw AOL offering access to the whole Internet to its
users for the first time, the introduction of both the Mosaic browser and
Photoshop 2.5; although flatbed scanner and OCR technology had been
around since 1978, they became practically available to individual users
only in the early 90s. In addition to a proliferation of tools that enabled
increasingly convenient exchange of digital files, the following decade
would see accelerated progress in public access to information online.
The Internet Archive, with its ever-expanding storehouse of material
(including rich collections of public domain works) became searchable
by the public in 2001, and catalogues of other digitized records followed;
in 2003, both “Open WorldCat” and an online index of public domain
titles digitized by Project Gutenberg were launched. Within a few years
of the CTEA’s enactment, the world in which this provision (and the rest
of copyright law) had altered materially and irreversibly—just as Barlow
had called it.
The opening of the Internet did not, in itself, create or even first
release the impulse to tinker with and recast found material for new
purposes. Elite writers and artists had been at it since Classical times,20
and in the late twentieth century Vidders21 and Ziners22 making creative
19

We might have known, had we been paying closer attention. In 2001, the
Digital Future Coalition, of which I had been an organizer, secured a small grant
from the MacArthur Foundation to study “messaging” strategies for public
interest campaigns around copyright policy. The goal was to identify key words
and concepts that might be deployed to counter the copyright industry’s very
effective communications campaign. We commissioned the Belden &
Russonello strategic consulting firm to conduct a series of structured focus
groups at sites across the U.S., and the results (never published nor, more’s the
pity, systematically implemented) were clear: the tropes of “freedom” and
“choice” had the potential to trump “piracy” and “property.”
20
See, e.g., Cento: Poetic Form, POETS.ORG (Feb. 20, 2014),
https://poets.org/text/cento-poetic-form.
21
See Morgan Dawn, A History of Vidding, VIDELICET,
https://vidders.github.io/articles/vidding/history.html (last visited May 18, 2019)
(“Vidding is communal poetry . . . .”).
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(and painstaking) use of analog technology showed the way. Internet
access did radically enlarge the population of people with the tools to
express that impulse. In so doing, it also expanded practical appreciation
for what could be done with diverse source material, including the rich
trove that is the public domain.23
Of course, there is more to the story. All honor goes to those
who, in the dark years after the CTEA’s enactment, kept the flame of the
public domain alive. The Eldred litigation itself, however unlikely of
conventional success, clearly raised levels of public awareness about the
issue, particularly among Internet users. The attention, in turn, energized
a powerful and persistent trope in which responsibility for term extension
was laid squarely at the feet of the Mouse-You-Love-to-Hate; despite its
tendency to obfuscate the real stakes and the forces actually at work,24
the meme had enormous power as an organizing tool. Essential books
like Laurence Lessig’s Free Culture (2004) and Remix (2008), or James
Boyle’s The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind
(2008), made indelible contributions, as has Duke University Law
School’s Center for the Study of the Public Domain (directed by Jennifer
Jenkins). Beginning in 2005, campaigns to raise awareness of the
“orphan works” problem that term extension did so much to exacerbate,
although they ultimately brought no legislative relief, had the secondary
effect of helping to refigure the public domain as a rich granary rather
than a run-down Roach Motel.
In an environment marked by ubiquitous high-speed Internet
connectivity, 200 million active websites, and a vast array of information
tools, the Web hasn’t brought us everything we hoped—and has brought
much we might never have wished to see. Ultimately, though, it was the
Internet itself that came to the rescue of copyright’s open spaces. In this
at least, John Perry Barlow’s organic vision of cyberspace has been
realized.

22

See A Brief History of Zines, DUKE UNIV. LIBRARIES,
https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/findingdb/zines/timeline/ (last visited May
18, 2019).
23
The ease with which information can be retrieved and repurposed online is not
restricted to material that is out of copyright. In fact, the forces at work behind
the markup in the cultural value of copyright-free material also helped to drive
the transformation of the fair use doctrine from 1994 onwards. See generally,
PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT
BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT (2d. ed. 2018).
24
In fact, the music industry was more vocal and effective in pushing for the
CTEA.

